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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
These appeals by defendants Anthony Morelli and Igor 
Roizman from judgments in a criminal case raise two 
issues of criminal law and procedure. Morelli's appeal 
centers on the interpretation of the federal money 
laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1956, in the context of wire 
fraud. Roizman's appeal involves the question of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where the defendant's attorney faces 
a possible conflict of interest. 
 
The scheme in which Morelli and Roizman were involved 
engaged in a series of transactions that resulted in the 
embezzlement of excise taxes from fuel sales. Each series 
included a number of wire transfers, each of which 
occurred after the money involved came into the possession 
of those who controlled the scheme. At trial, the 
government proved only that specific transfers had 
occurred before the point at which the taxes should have 
been collected for transmittal to the government. Morelli 
argues that these series of transactions did not constitute 
money laundering. 
 
He claims initially that the government failed to prove 
that any of the transactions involved proceeds of fraud, 
since the government offered no proof of wire transfers 
occurring after the point at which the taxes should have 
been collected. He contends that the money did not become 
the proceeds of fraud until after it should have been 
collected for the government but was not. We reject this 
conclusion because we believe that the money became the 
proceeds of fraud as soon as it entered the hands of 
members of the scheme. Alternatively, Morelli submits that 
the money was not the proceeds of wire fraud because the 
money came into the possession of the scheme as a result 
of fraud before any of the wirings involving the money 
occurred. But he ignores the fact that the scheme 
succeeded as a result of each and every wiring within each 
and every series of transactions. Accordingly, the money 
within each series of transactions was the proceeds of wire 
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fraud because the fraud from which it resulted was 
promoted by the wire transfers within the preceding series 
of transactions. 
 
Morelli also contends that the District Court erred in not 
granting him a downward departure from the money 
laundering guideline, U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1, because his conduct 
did not fall within the "heartland" of money laundering. We 
disagree, and dispose of this contention summarily in note 
13 infra. 
 
Roizman's appeal alleges that his attorney provided 
inadequate assistance because of a conflict of interest. 
Roizman's attorney represented both him and an individual 
whose statements were introduced at trial as hearsay 
evidence against him. Roizman first argues that his lawyer's 
conduct was deficient since he faced an actual conflict of 
interest to the extent that his ability to impeach the 
witness's hearsay statements conflicted with his duties to 
the witness as his client. The District Court rejected this 
claim because it found that impeachment of the witness 
was not a "plausible alternative defense strategy" for 
Roizman. Because we agree with the District Court's 
conclusion, and because such impeachment would not 
have adversely affected the witness's interests, we reject 
Roizman's argument. 
 
Roizman also contends that his conviction should be 
reversed on a potential conflict-of-interest theory. He claims 
that the prosecutor, as well as his own attorney, knew of 
the conflict his attorney faced and, thus, violated his 
constitutional rights by not bringing it to the attention of 
the District Court. We can only grant a reversal for a 
potential conflict of interest, however, if the District Court 
itself was or should have been aware of the conflict and 
failed to address it. Since Roizman does not contend that 
the District Court should have been aware of the conflict, 
we reject his claim. We will therefore affirm the judgments 
of the District Court. 
 
I. Procedural History 
 
Morelli, Roizman and a number of coconspirators 
participated in a "daisy chain" scheme to evade excise taxes 
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on the sale of certain kinds of fuel. The elements of such 
schemes have been detailed sufficiently elsewhere. See, e.g., 
United States v. Sertich, 95 F.3d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1113 (1997); United States v. Veksler, 
62 F.3d 544, 547 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Macchia, 
35 F.3d 662, 665-66 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Victoria-21, 3 F.3d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Assets of 
Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1353 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512, 1514-17 (2d Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 495-96 (2d Cir. 
1990), vacated, 955 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1991). We will set forth 
any relevant facts in our discussion of particular 
substantive issues. 
 
As a result of their activities, Morelli and Roizman were 
charged in a forty four-count indictment, tried, and 
convicted of some of the counts. Several other 
coconspirators pleaded guilty at different times. Morelli was 
convicted of a RICO conspiracy, racketeering, an extortion 
conspiracy, extortion, mail fraud, and general conspiracy. 
With respect to the RICO conspiracy, the jury found that 
the government had proven money laundering as one of 
many predicate acts. With respect to the general conspiracy 
conviction, the jury found that one of the objects of the 
conspiracy, among others, was money laundering. Morelli 
was not named in any of the racketeering acts alleging 
money laundering. However, he was sentenced under the 
money laundering guideline, which provided the highest 
offense level. He received a three-point enhancement 
because he acted as a manager or supervisor of the money 
laundering conspiracy. The District Court then departed 
downward three levels, finding that the value of the funds 
laundered detailed in the Presentence Investigation Report 
overrepresented the crime. Morelli was sentenced to 240 
months in prison. Roizman was convicted of RICO 
conspiracy, mail fraud, and extortion, and was sentenced to 
90 months in prison. These timely appeals followed. 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the matter 
under 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We exercise appellate jurisdiction over the final 
judgment of the District Court under 18 U.S.C. S 3742 and 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
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In addition to the arguments outlined in the introduction, 
the defendants each make a number of arguments that are 
patently without merit; hence we identify them and dispose 
of them summarily in the margin. Morelli contends that the 
District Court erred in applying his Role in the Offense 
adjustment to all of his offense groupings for sentencing 
purposes.2 He also claims that he should not have been 
convicted of RICO conspiracy because he did not commit or 
agree to commit two predicate acts.3 Finally, Morelli insists 
that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated 
because two cooperating witnesses, Dougherty and Zummo, 
had previously participated in a joint defense agreement.4 
Roizman adopts by reference those of Morelli's claims that 
are relevant to him.5 
 
Following the initial oral argument in this case in June of 
1997, we placed it in abeyance pending the Supreme 
Court's decision in Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Morelli submits that the Sentencing GuidelineS 3B1.1 enhancement 
for "Role in the Offense" should have been applied only to the extortion 
group of crimes, and not the money laundering or fraud groups. The 
District Court concluded otherwise, and we see no error in its 
conclusion. The evidence supports the conclusion that Morelli was a 
"supervisor or manager" with respect to the fraud and money laundering, 
as well as the extortion. 
 
3. Morelli's appeal on this point rested on his argument that we should 
reverse our decision in United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 
1985). However, the Supreme Court has held that our conclusion in 
Adams was correct. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). 
 
4. The District Court found no such violation of Morelli's Sixth 
Amendment rights. United States v. Morelli, Opinion & Order, Crim. No. 
93-210 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 1998). It concluded that"[t]here was no evidence 
that either Dougherty or Zummo revealed any confidential defense 
strategy or any other prejudicial information to the Government." Slip 
op. at 7. We see no clear error in its finding, and accordingly affirm its 
conclusion that Morelli's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. 
Morelli also argued that the government should have been directed to 
produce its notes of its meetings with Dougherty and Zummo for 
Morelli's inspection. Based on our in camera inspection of these notes we 
agree with the District Court that they contained no information 
pertinent to his claim. 
 
5. Since we affirm the District Court's conclusions on all points, we need 
not determine precisely which of Morelli's arguments Roizman adopts. 
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(1997). See supra note 3; see also United States v. Morelli, 
Order, Nos. 96-5144 & 96-5389 (3d Cir. June 23, 1997). In 
the meantime, we remanded certain issues to the District 
Court for further factual findings. The Supreme Court has 
now decided Salinas, see supra note 3, and the District 
Court has certified its findings on the issues to which we 
directed its attention, see supra note 4 & infra Part III. 
Accordingly, the appeal is now ripe for decision. 
 
II. Morelli's Appeal 
 
A. Preservation of Issue for Review 
 
We first take up Morelli's argument that the District 
Court erred in calculating his sentence based primarily on 
the money laundering guideline, U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1. He 
contends that, as a matter of law, the facts do not support 
the conclusion that money laundering occurred. Although 
Morelli frames this submission as a challenge to his 
sentence, it is in actuality a sufficiency of the evidence 
argument. Morelli did not raise this in a Rule 29 motion, 
which would ordinarily be required of a sufficiency claim. 
See United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 466-67 (3d Cir. 
1997) ("If a defendant fails to file a timely motion for 
judgment of acquittal, we review sufficiency of evidence for 
plain error." (citing United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 
509 (3d Cir.1997))), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 454 (1997). 
Nevertheless we find that it is properly before us on the 
conventional direct appeal standard of review because of 
the unusual procedural posture, i.e., that this issue is only 
relevant for sentencing purposes. 
 
Morelli was convicted of a multiple-object general 
conspiracy and a RICO conspiracy with numerous predicate 
acts. The jury found that these conspiracies had objects or 
predicate acts other than money laundering that Morelli 
does not challenge on appeal. Thus, even if he presented a 
successful challenge to the money laundering allegations, 
we would not reverse Morelli's conviction on the conspiracy 
count because, as he concedes, he was involved in a 
criminal conspiracy, albeit one to commit mail and wire 
fraud and extortion. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 
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46 (1991); United States v. Conley (Conley II), 92 F.3d 157, 
163 (3d Cir. 1996) ("It is clear that when a jury returns a 
general verdict of guilty on a multi-object conspiracy count, 
the conviction will stand over Fifth Amendment due process 
objections so long as there is sufficient evidence to support 
any one of the objects of the conspiracy."), cert. denied, 520 
U.S. 1115 (1997). Likewise, he cannot challenge his RICO 
conspiracy conviction, as he concedes numerous predicate 
acts, including those same crimes, which are sufficient to 
support the conviction. See United States v. Vastola, 989 
F.2d 1318, 1330 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying the reasoning of 
Griffin and concluding that the dismissal of one predicate 
act did not require reversal of a racketeering conviction 
where a sufficient number of other predicate acts on which 
the jury's verdict could have rested remained). 
 
Furthermore, determining the objects of a conspiracy and 
the predicate acts of a RICO conspiracy for sentencing 
purposes is the duty of the trial judge, not the jury. See 
Conley II, 92 F.3d at 169 ("[T]he district court's 
determination of the object of the conspiracy is wholly 
independent of the jury's determination of the object of the 
conspiracy."). Since this decision on the part of the District 
Court is not bound up with the jury's verdict, it need not be 
challenged in a Rule 29 motion for acquittal 
notwithstanding the jury's verdict.6 Rather, a defendant 
need only challenge the district court's findings as to the 
objects of the conspiracy and the RICO predicate acts at 
sentencing in order to preserve the issue for review. 
Because Morelli raised his present claim in his sentencing 
hearing, we conclude that it is appropriately before us. 
"When [as here] the essential facts are not in dispute, our 
review of the district court's interpretation of the 
Guidelines, like our review of a statute's interpretation, is 
plenary." United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citing United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 790-91 
(3d Cir.1990)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Unlike the verdict in Conley II, the jury in this case returned a 
special 
verdict concerning the objects of the conspiracy and the predicate acts 
of the RICO conspiracy. Accordingly, the District Court's conclusion that 
money laundering occurred is buttressed by the jury's special verdicts to 
similar effect. 
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B. Money Laundering -- Facts and Legal Background 
 
Because the facts of this case are somewhat complicated, 
we will briefly review those revolving around the alleged 
money laundering. The particular scheme in which the 
defendants participated was termed "the Association." The 
Association organized a group of companies, all of which it 
controlled, into a "daisy chain," for the purpose of 
embezzling the excise taxes on the sale of certain kinds of 
fuel. Typically, the companies would sell oil down the chain 
in a series of paper transactions, through what was referred 
to as the "burn company." Eventually, the company at the 
bottom of the chain, the "street company," would sell the oil 
to a legitimate retailer, i.e., a particular gas station, for a 
price slightly below the tax-included market price. This 
retailer would pay money to the street company, which 
would send money back up the chain in a series of wire 
transfers.7 
 
This scheme was illegal because it was set up as a means 
to avoid excise taxes. The daisy chain was established so 
that the burn company was the one legally responsible for 
collecting the excise taxes on the fuel sales and 
transmitting them to the government. In the Association's 
scheme, the burn company would collect the taxes for a 
time, and then disappear without ever paying the taxes to 
the government. As a result, the Association could keep the 
money representing the excise taxes without the 
government being able to determine where it had gone. The 
indictment charged, and the jury found, that this conduct 
constituted both wire fraud and money laundering. It 
charged the first wire transfer, from the street company to 
the next company above it in the chain, as wire fraud. It 
charged the second and subsequent wire transfers as 
money laundering. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The money was not always wired back up the chain via each 
individual company. Occasionally, a wire transfer would skip some 
companies. In addition, the wire transfers apparently almost always 
skipped the burn company. As the discussion below demonstrates, 
however, these details need not concern us, because it is sufficient that 
the money was wired at least once. 
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The money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(1), 
provides: 
 
       Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a 
       financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 
       form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to 
       conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 
       involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity -- 
       (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of 
       specified unlawful activity; or . . . (B) knowing that the 
       transaction is designed in whole or in part -- (i) to 
       conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, 
       the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of 
       specified unlawful activity . . . [is guilty of money 
       laundering]. 
 
The statute, in pertinent part, sets forth four elements of 
the crime: (1) an actual or attempted financial transaction 
(2) involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; (3) 
knowledge that the transaction involves the proceeds of 
some unlawful activity; and (4) either (a) an intent to 
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, or (b) 
knowledge that the transaction is designed to promote the 
underlying specified unlawful activity or "to conceal or 
disguise the nature [or] the source . . . of the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(1). Morelli 
does not contest the first and third elements. He also does 
not contest the intent element of money laundering.8 
 
The term "specified unlawful activity" is defined, in 
pertinent part, by reference to those acts that constitute 
"racketeering acts" under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 1956(c)(7)(A) ("[T]he term `specified unlawful activity' 
means any act or activity constituting an offense listed in 
section 1961(1) of this title . . . ."). UnderS 1961(1), wire 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. He does complain, however, that it is unfair for the government to 
charge both promotion and concealment with respect to the same 
transactions. See United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 
1993) (noting that another court has observed that"conduct punishable 
[as concealment] typically would not also be punishable [as promotion, 
and vice versa]"). We have noted, however, that these two motivations are 
not necessarily inconsistent, as "a finding of guilt [for concealment] is 
not a defense to a prosecution [for promotion]." 998 F.2d at 1218 n.3. 
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fraud is a "specified unlawful activity," but tax fraud 
simpliciter is not. See 18 U.S.C. S 1961(1)(B). 
 
We have interpreted the money laundering statute several 
times. See, e.g., United States v. Conley (Conley I), 37 F.3d 
970 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212 
(3d Cir. 1993). Paramo focused solely on the fourth element 
of the statute -- whether the defendant's actions 
constituted sufficient evidence of the appropriate intent. 
See 998 F.2d at 1216-18. In Conley I, we focused both on 
this intent element and on the second element -- whether 
the funds at issue were the "proceeds of a specified 
unlawful activity." 37 F.3d at 977-81. Whether certain 
money constitutes "proceeds of specified unlawful activity" 
is the sole contested question presented in this case. 
 
In Conley I, we held that "[a]lthough the money 
laundering statute does not define when money becomes 
`proceeds,' it is obvious to us that proceeds are derived from 
an already completed offense, or a completed phase of an 
ongoing offense . . . ." 37 F.3d at 980. This is true even if 
the money laundering transaction can also be considered a 
part of the continuing specified unlawful activity. In Conley 
I, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to conduct an 
illegal gambling business and to commit money laundering. 
The conspiracy revolved around the distribution and use of 
illegal video poker machines. The money laundering aspect 
of the scheme derived from the retrieval and distribution of 
the money deposited in the machines. We concluded that, 
since the distribution and use of the machines alone 
constituted an illegal gambling business, the specified 
unlawful activity had been completed at the time the 
conspiracy's activities resulted in proceeds. Accordingly, the 
money retrieved from the machines was proceeds of the 
illegal gambling business, even though the retrieval of the 
money was also chargeable as part of the crime of 
conducting the business. See 37 F.3d at 980. 
 
This case forces us to decide the question we partially 
(and tangentially) addressed in Conley I: whether the funds 
involved in the alleged money laundering transaction were 
"proceeds of specified unlawful activity." Morelli makes two 
arguments. First, he contends that the money did not 
become proceeds until after it passed through the burn 
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company. He alleges that this is significant because the 
government offered no evidence as to how much money was 
wired after it passed through the burn company, thus 
failing to prove that money laundering occurred. In the 
alternative, he claims that, if the money became proceeds 
before it passed through the burn company, it did so as 
soon as it came into the Association's control. Thus, it 
cannot have been the proceeds of wire fraud, since the wire 
fraud was predicated on the money being wired after it 
entered the control of the Association. We address these 
points in turn. 
 
C. Did the Transactions Involve the Proceeds 
       of the Fraud? 
 
The government only proved financial transactions, i.e., 
wirings of money up the daisy chain, occurring before the 
money reached the burn company. Accordingly, if the 
money did not become proceeds until after it passed 
through the burn company, as Morelli contends, the 
government's proof of money laundering would have failed 
because it would not have proved a financial transaction 
involving proceeds. 
 
Morelli argues that the money did not become proceeds 
until it moved past the burn company. In essence, he 
contends that since the duty to pay the taxes lay with the 
burn company, no fraud occurred until the burn company 
itself failed to collect and pay the taxes. Hence, before the 
burn company failed to do so, the money was entirely 
legitimate. But the taxes were not, as Morelli claims, 
collected and passed on, and then diverted. They were 
never collected. The paperwork that indicated that the taxes 
had been collected was falsified. The transactions going 
down the chain --purporting to represent sales of fuel -- 
were fraudulent, and the payments going back up the chain 
were proceeds of that fraud. 
 
In our view, the key point is that the entire chain of 
companies was operated by the Association; it was all part 
of the conspiracy. Once the money entered the control of 
the street company, it entered the control of the 
Association. The Association never had any intention of 
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paying the taxes. It organized the chain precisely to avoid 
having to do so. Although in a paperwork sense the taxes 
were not embezzled until they passed the burn company, 
the reality is that the taxes were embezzled as soon as the 
funds entered the chain. The fact that the Association 
organized the daisy chain to make it appear that distinct 
companies were buying and selling the gas and that the tax 
was collected at each step prior to the burn company does 
not alter our conclusion. We conclude that the fraud was 
completed when the money entered the control of the 
Association acting through the street company, since at 
that time it had no present intent to pay the taxes. Under 
these circumstances, the taxing authorities were defrauded 
out of their funds at the time the money entered the chain. 
 
In sum, we find no reason to set aside the judge's and 
jury's implicit conclusion that the money derived from this 
scheme became proceeds for the Association as soon as it 
entered the street company's hands. Legally, the money 
was the proceeds of fraud as soon as it entered the hands 
of the street company. 
 
D. Was the Money the Proceeds of Wire Fraud? 
 
We also think that the money was the proceeds of wire 
fraud, and not simply tax fraud, which is not a specified 
RICO predicate act and therefore not a specified unlawful 
activity under S 1956. Morelli contends that, even if the 
money became proceeds of some illegal activity at the time 
it came into the possession of the street company, it was 
only the proceeds of tax fraud. He argues that, at the time 
the money entered the hands of the street company, no 
wire fraud had occurred. Before it was wired, he says, the 
money was the proceeds of tax fraud. After it was wired, the 
argument continues, although a wire fraud may have been 
committed, the money was not the proceeds of a wire fraud, 
because the wiring itself had nothing to do with the 
Association's coming into possession of the money. 
 
As an initial matter, we think that Morelli would be 
correct that the the money would not be the proceeds of 
wire fraud if only one of these daisy chain series of 
transactions had occurred. Proceeds are "[t]hat which 
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results, proceeds, or accrues from some possession or 
transaction." Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (6th ed. 1990). 
The transaction series in question here is the single series 
of wirings of the funds from the street company up the 
chain through the burn company to the top. We think it is 
obvious that the money that the Association fraudulently 
obtained does not "result, proceed, or accrue" from this 
single series of wirings, and therefore the money is not the 
proceeds of wire fraud. Within the individual series of 
transactions, the money is the proceeds of fraud simpliciter 
at the time it enters the Association's hands. The later 
wirings do not change its character into the proceeds of 
wire fraud.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Accordingly, we disagree with the opinion of the Seventh Circuit in 
United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d 694 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 
S. Ct. 621 (1998). That court, relying on inter alia Schmuck v. United 
States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), concluded that, unlike bank and wire fraud, 
"[a] mail fraud scheme . . . can create proceeds long before the mailing 
ever takes place." 151 F.3d at 705. We think that that court misreads 
Schmuck. In Schmuck, the defendant created an ongoing fraudulent 
scheme that involved a group of independent series of fraudulent 
transactions. Each of these series ended with a mailing, which the 
Supreme Court held could provide a basis for mail fraud convictions. 
The Seventh Circuit apparently reads Schmuck as meaning that the 
mailings rendered the individual series of transactions with which they 
were associated mail fraud nunc pro tunc. 
 
We disagree. As discussed in more detail below, the key in Schmuck 
was not that the mailings increased the likelihood of success of the 
individual fraudulent series of transactions. Rather, each individual 
mailing contributed to the future success of the entire scheme. See 489 
U.S. at 711-12 (although the mailings may not have contributed to the 
success of the individual already-completed series of transactions, they 
were "essential to the perpetuation of Schmuck's scheme"). Thus, we 
think that Schmuck does not support the Seventh Circuit's 
understanding of the term "proceeds" in the money laundering statute. 
 
We also note that the court in Mankarious drew a false distinction 
between wire and mail fraud. See Mankarious, 151 F.3d at 705. As we 
have noted, the wire fraud and mail fraud statutes differ only in form, 
not in substance, and cases such as Schmuck interpreting one govern 
the other as well. See United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 & n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 
1977) ("[T]he cases interpreting the mail fraud statute are applicable to 
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This does not get Morelli off the hook, however. We 
believe that the money wired up from the street company 
was, in fact, the proceeds of wire fraud, just not in the way 
Morelli thinks it might have been. In order to understand 
this, we must engage in a close reading of the wire fraud 
statute, which reads as follows: 
 
        Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
       scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
       property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
       representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be 
       transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
       communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any 
       writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the 
       purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be 
       fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 
       five years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1343. Wire fraud consists of (1) a scheme to 
defraud and (2) a use of a wire transmission for the 
purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme. 
See Frey, 42 F.3d at 797. Morelli concedes that the daisy 
chain was a scheme to defraud. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, the scheme produced proceeds. The question is, was 
the scheme a wire fraud scheme in such a way that its 
proceeds were the proceeds of wire fraud at the time the 
Association conducted a financial transaction involving 
them? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the wire fraud statute as well.")). Thus, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion 
would -- if correct -- apply equally to cases involving wire fraud. 
 
Finally, we observe that none of this implies that Morelli did not 
conspire to commit wire fraud. A wiring could constitute wire fraud even 
though it involved money that had already been obtained as a result of 
fraud. See United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348, 1362 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that "acts occurring after the defrauding defendant already 
controls the proceeds of the fraud may . . . further the fraud" and 
accordingly constitute wire fraud); cf. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 712 (holding 
that mail fraud occurs so long as the mailing is "incident to an essential 
part of the scheme" (internal quotations omitted)). Clearly, the wirings 
in 
this case were "incident to an essential part of the scheme," the 
transmittal of the money in a useable form to the members of the 
Association. 
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We think the money was the proceeds of the entire 
ongoing fraudulent venture in which the Association 
engaged in creating the daisy chain scheme, and that this 
venture was a wire fraud scheme. This ongoing venture 
consisted of all the individual series of transactions upon 
which Morelli focuses, not the discrete series of 
transactions individually. Although each series may have 
included discrete acts of wire fraud that followed the 
creation of the proceeds related to that series, the fact is 
that the entire program, encompassing all of the acts 
charged in the indictment, constituted one large, ongoing 
wire fraud scheme. Each wiring in each series furthered the 
execution of each and every individual act of tax fraud, and 
helped to create the proceeds involved in each succeeding 
series of transactions. This is primarily because each 
wiring, whether it occurred before or after a given act of tax 
fraud, served to promote and conceal each individual 
embezzlement of taxes, either ex ante or ex post. More 
precisely, each wiring, including those that occurred before 
a particular transaction, made it more difficult for the 
government to detect the entire fraudulent scheme or any 
particular fraudulent transaction or series of transactions. 
In sum, the money gained in each series of transactions 
(save the initial one) was the proceeds of wire fraud because 
the money was the proceeds of a fraud that was furthered 
by the prior wirings.10 
 
This case is similar to Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 
705 (1989). In Schmuck, the Supreme Court upheld the 
defendant's conviction for mail fraud. The defendant had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We note that this means that the funds acquired in the first series 
of transactions were not the proceeds of wire fraud. This is immaterial, 
however, since the first series, as noted above, would still constitute 
wire 
fraud, and the aggregate amount of proceeds would not be reduced 
significantly enough to reduce Morelli's sentence. No individual series of 
transactions involved more than a few hundred thousand dollars, 
whereas the ongoing scheme involved tens of millions of dollars. The 
largest single wire transfer listed in the indictment was for $780,000. 
Subtracting this amount from the total amount upon which Morelli's 
sentence was based would not change the specific offense characteristic 
category for the amount laundered. See U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1(b)(2). 
Accordingly, any error in including the funds from the first series of 
transactions was harmless. 
 
                                16 
  
created a scheme in which he would roll back the 
odometers on cars and sell them as new to car dealers. As 
with any car sale, each unwitting dealer would mail a title- 
application form to the state government. The Court 
concluded that this mailing was sufficient to support a mail 
fraud conviction. In particular, the Court found that: 
 
       Schmuck's was not a "one-shot" operation in which he 
       sold a single car to an isolated dealer. His was an 
       ongoing fraudulent venture. A rational jury could have 
       concluded that the success of Schmuck's venture 
       depended upon his continued harmonious relationship 
       with, and good reputation among, retail dealers, which 
       in turn required the smooth flow of cars from the 
       dealers to their Wisconsin customers. 
 
        Under these circumstances, we believe that a rational 
       jury could have found that the title-registration 
       mailings were part of the execution of the fraudulent 
       scheme . . . . [A]lthough the registration-form mailings 
       may not have contributed directly to the duping of 
       either the retail dealers or the customers, they were 
       necessary to the passage of title, which in turn was 
       essential to the perpetuation of Schmuck's scheme. 
 
489 U.S. at 711-12. In Schmuck, the Court recognized that, 
even though each individual fraudulent transaction series 
involved a mailing only after the fraud had already been 
completed, each mailing contributed to the entire scheme 
and made each other individual fraudulent transaction 
series, particularly those occurring later, more likely to be 
successful.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We recently distinguished Schmuck, although not in a way that is 
relevant here. In United States v. Cross, 128 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1519 (1998), we reversed mail fraud convictions 
based on the fact that, although the mailing at issue aided the success 
of the fraud, the mailing would have occurred whether the fraud had 
taken place or not. The alleged fraud involved fixing traffic court cases. 
The mailings at issue were the routine transmissions of case dispositions 
to the parties. We distinguished Schmuck on the ground that "the court 
regularly mailed notices to parties and the DOT in every case, whether 
or not the defendants had attempted to influence the result." 128 F.3d 
at 152 n.4. There was no causal nexus between the fraud and the 
mailings in Cross. Here, by contrast, the wirings, like the mailings in 
Schmuck, would not have been made but for the existence of the 
fraudulent scheme. Morelli's case is much more like Schmuck than 
Cross. 
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This case is controlled by Schmuck. Each wiring 
concealed and promoted each and every fraudulent series 
of transactions by making the entire scheme less 
detectable. Without the wirings to make it appear as if a 
series of distinct transactions between independent 
companies had occurred, the taxing authorities would have 
had a much easier time tracking down the perpetrators of 
the tax fraud scheme. Each wiring "was essential to the 
perpetuation of [the Association]'s scheme." Schmuck, 489 
U.S. at 712. Since each individual fraudulent series of 
transactions other than the initial one was preceded by a 
wiring that promoted it, we think that, within each 
transaction series, the money was the proceeds of wire 
fraud at the time it came into the hands of the Association 
in the form of the street company. As soon as one wiring 
took place, the entire tax fraud scheme became a wire fraud 
scheme. Since the very first series of transactions involved 
a wiring of the funds, every fraudulent acquisition of funds 
thereafter was an acquisition of funds through wire fraud. 
 
This conclusion is entirely consistent with Conley I. See 
37 F.3d at 980 (requiring that proceeds be "derived from an 
already completed offense, or a completed phase of an 
ongoing offense"). The entire daisy chain was an ongoing 
fraudulent venture. Each series of transactions within it 
was a "completed phase" of the ongoing scheme. As we 
discussed above, the phases were completed as soon as one 
wiring occurred as part of the entire venture and the money 
from the individual series of transactions came into the 
possession of the street company aspect of the Association. 
 
Morelli's case also resembles United States v. Massey, 48 
F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1995). In Massey, the defendants 
convinced a number of people to invest in their fraudulent 
loan scheme. When some of the participants became 
concerned that they had not received their loans, the 
defendants sent them letters encouraging them not to 
withdraw their money. Later, one of the defendants wired 
some of the money to another defendant. The defendants 
were convicted of mail fraud and money laundering. See 48 
F.3d at 1565. The defendants claimed that none of the 
money involved in the wiring came from victims who 
received the mailings. Accordingly, the defendants argued 
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that the money wired could not have been the proceeds of 
mail fraud. 
 
The court of appeals upheld the conviction. While noting 
that the defendants' assessment of the facts was correct, as 
far as it went, it observed that at least two mailings had 
been sent to victims prior to the wiring, albeit not to victims 
whose money was transferred in the wiring. See 48 F.3d at 
1566. The court concluded that these mailings not only 
contributed to the success of the fraud with respect to the 
victims who received them but also to the overall success of 
the entire fraudulent loan program. See 48 F.3d at 1567 
("[T]he letters protected the plan to defraud all of the 
victims and not just the victim to whom the letter was 
sent."). In particular, if the letters had not been sent to the 
other victims, the fraud with respect to the victims whose 
money was wire transferred might not have been 
successful. See 48 F.3d at 1566-67. Accordingly, 
 
       the jury could reasonably find that the fees deposited 
       in the bank account from which the wire transfer was 
       sent were derived from the fraudulent scheme that was 
       furthered by the lulling letters. The "proceeds" of mail 
       fraud are derived from the success of a fraudulent 
       scheme that has been facilitated through the use of the 
       mails. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the jury had 
       sufficient evidence to conclude that the government 
       met all of the elements of money laundering . . . . 
 
48 F.3d at 1567 (citations omitted). 
 
We find Massey persuasive. Moreover, Morelli's case is 
indistinguishable from Massey. Had some or all of the 
wirings not occurred, some of the daisy chain transaction 
series might have been detected by the taxing authorities 
and the entire scheme would have been discovered sooner. 
Each of the wirings made before each individual fraudulent 
series of transactions contributed to the success of those 
transactions. As in Massey, the money resulting from these 
transactions was the proceeds of wire fraud at the time of 
the wire transfers. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury 
and the District Court had sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the government met all of the elements of money 
laundering under S 1956.12 Therefore, we think the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Both parties in this case cite a number of other cases that they 
believe are relevant to the issue before us. See, e.g., United States v. 
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Court properly sentenced Morelli under the money 
laundering guideline.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Christo, 129 F.3d 578 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 
1348 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992). We do not believe 
these cases aid us in deciding the issue before us. They all involved the 
temporal question whether, at the time the alleged money laundering 
transaction occurred, the money involved in the transaction was 
proceeds. See, e.g., Allen, 76 F.3d at 1362 ("In this case, the consultant 
fees and loans left the control of First City Bank and reached the 
accounts of the conspirators before the wire transfers occurred. The 
charged transactions distributed the proceeds among the various 
defendants and helped hide the fraud from First City auditors and 
federal regulators."); Kennedy, 64 F.3d at 1478 ("[T]he illegal mailings 
in 
this case involved discrete, earlier mailings by Kennedy, rather than the 
receipt of funds by Kennedy from his victims. It was the subsequent and 
distinct transfers of funds that were alleged as the separate transactions 
involving `proceeds of specified unlawful activity' which constituted the 
alleged money laundering under S 1956."). This is the question we 
addressed in Conley I, 37 F.3d at 980 (proceeds must be "derived from 
an already completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing 
offense"). The question before us today, on the other hand, is the more 
abstract question whether the money was the proceeds of wire fraud. 
These cases do not help us answer that question. 
 
13. Morelli also contends that the District Court erred in failing to 
grant 
him a downward departure because, even if the conspiracy involved 
money laundering, it was not within the "heartland" of money 
laundering. He relies on proposed amendments to the money laundering 
guidelines, which Congress rejected in 1995, that would have tied money 
laundering sentences to the offense level of the underlying specified 
unlawful activity. He also contends that he is entitled to a downward 
departure because the government charged him, unlike others who 
engaged in similar schemes but were prosecuted separately, with money 
laundering. Morelli claims that this constitutes unfair sentence 
manipulation. 
 
The District Court did grant Morelli a downward departure on the 
ground that the "value of the funds" adjustment under U.S.S.G. 
S 2S1.1(b)(2) overstated the seriousness of the money laundering that 
occurred. See United States v. Morelli, Opinion, Crim. No. 93-210, at 16- 
19 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 1996). If the District Court refused to grant a larger 
downward departure in an exercise of its discretion, we have no 
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III. Roizman's Appeal 
 
Roizman argues that his conviction should be reversed 
because of an actual or potential conflict in his attorney's 
representation of both him and one Igor Porotsky. Porotsky 
was neither a codefendant nor a witness at trial, but his 
statements were admitted as hearsay statements through 
the testimony of other witnesses. In particular, various 
witnesses testified that Porotsky had been involved in the 
fuel business before the Association was created, and that 
he had been involved with Morelli and other alleged 
members of the Italian Mafia. At the time of trial, Larry 
Silverman, who was then Roizman's attorney, was also 
representing Porotsky in a separate matter.14 Roizman 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
jurisdiction to consider Morelli's claim. See United States v. Khalil, 132 
F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 668 n.11 
(3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1990). 
On the other hand, if the sentencing court denied a larger downward 
departure because it erroneously concluded it lacked legal authority to 
consider a separate ground for departure, we have jurisdiction to review 
the sentence. See United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 160 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1992). 
 
In this case, however, the District Court committed no error. Despite 
Morelli's repeated and vociferous arguments, proposed amendments to 
the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide independent legal authority for 
a downward departure. See United States v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (explaining persuasively why proposed crack cocaine 
amendments did not provide independent authority for a downward 
departure). Furthermore, Morelli's invocation of United States v. 
Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 994-96 (3d Cir. 1992), in which we affirmed a 
district court's grant of a downward departure for manipulation of the 
indictment, does not help him since in that case the district court had 
decided in its discretion that a downward departure was appropriate and 
the question on appeal was whether the district court had authority to 
do so. Here, by contrast, the District Court considered both of Morelli's 
proposed grounds for departure and exercised its discretion to reject 
them. Accordingly, since Morelli's argument is essentially a challenge to 
the District Court's exercise of its discretion in denying him an 
additional downward departure, we have no jurisdiction to consider his 
claim. 
 
14. We need not consider the much-debated issue of the precise scope of 
this representation, however, since we conclude that, regardless of the 
scope of the representation, cross-examining Porotsky was not a useful 
alternative strategy and, at all events, doing so would not have 
conflicted 
with Silverman's duties to Porotsky. 
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argues that, as a result of this representation, Silverman 
suffered a conflict and was unable to impeach Porotsky as 
a hearsay declarant adequately. See Fed. R. Evid. 806 
(permitting impeachment of the declarant of statements 
admitted as hearsay). Roizman also contends that, even if 
this was only a potential conflict, it merits a reversal 
because counsel for the government should have been 
aware of it at trial. 
 
After we remanded Roizman's claims to the District 
Court, the Court heard arguments and considered the 
documentary evidence. For the reasons set forth infra, the 
District Court rejected all of Roizman's claims regarding 
Silverman's representation and alleged conflict of interest. 
"We apply plenary review to the district court's application 
of legal precepts, and clearly erroneous review to its factual 
findings." United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citations omitted). 
 
A. Actual Conflict of Interest 
 
An actual conflict claim arises after trial upon the 
discovery of a previously unnoticed conflict of interest on 
the part of trial counsel. "[A] defendant who raised no 
objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict 
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). We have 
elaborated on this as follows: "An actual conflict of interest 
`is evidenced if, during the course of the representation, the 
defendants' interests diverge with respect to a material 
factual or legal issue or to a course of action.' " United 
States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1086 (3d Cir. 
1983)). In addition, we have noted that an actual conflict is 
more likely to be found where "an attorney takes positive 
steps on behalf of one client prejudicial to another" as 
opposed to cases where "the attorney's actions are based on 
inaction and are passive." Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070. 
 
Similarly, an actual conflict is more likely to occur in 
cases of joint representation -- representation of more than 
one defendant at the same trial -- rather than simply 
multiple representation -- representation of defendants in 
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different trials -- as occurred here. In cases involving 
multiple but not joint representation, and when an attorney 
has in some way failed to act, we have adopted the 
following standard: 
 
       In order to establish an actual conflict the petitioner 
       must show two elements. First, he must demonstrate 
       that some plausible alternative defense strategy or 
       tactic might have been pursued. He need not show that 
       the defense would necessarily have been successful if 
       it had been used, but that it possessed sufficient 
       substance to be a viable alternative. Second, he must 
       establish that the alternative defense was inherently in 
       conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's 
       other loyalties or interests. 
 
Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070 (quoting United States v. Fahey, 
769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir. 1985)); see also Hess v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 135 F.3d 905, 910 (3d Cir. 1998). When an 
actual conflict with an adverse effect, of the sort described 
above, is demonstrated, the defendant is entitled to a 
reversal for inadequate assistance of counsel without 
demonstrating prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 692 (1984).15 
 
The District Court found no actual conflict in Silverman's 
representation of both Porotsky and Roizman. In particular, 
the court found that Silverman's decision not to attempt to 
impeach Porotsky was a reasonable strategic decision: 
 
        In this case, it is abundantly clear from an 
       examination of Mr. Roizman's claim in the larger 
       context of the trial that cross-examination of Mr. 
       Porotsky was not a plausible defense strategy that 
       "possessed sufficient substance" to raise a claim of 
       constitutional dimension. . . . 
 
        The Court's observations during the lengthy trial 
       confirm that Mr. Roizman's attorney pursued a 
       "wallflower" defense -- that is, that Mr. Roizman was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Of course, if the defendant cannot prevail on an actual conflict 
theory, the defendant can still bring a conventional ineffective 
assistance 
claim under Strickland, but the defendant must then show prejudice. See 
Hess, 135 F.3d at 910. 
 
                                23 
  
       an innocent operator who was a victim of intimidation 
       from other organized crime figures. To have vigorously 
       cross-examined Porotsky, a witness whose hearsay 
       testimony was cumulative and peripheral, and to 
       therefore have risked creating in the jurors' minds a 
       connection between Porotsky and Roizman, would have 
       been asinine in light of the strategy Mr. Roizman 
       pursued. The Court, drawing on its observation of the 
       strategy employed during the trial, as well as Mr. 
       Silverman's affidavit submitted herewith, concludes 
       that the decision not to cross-examine Mr. Porotsky's 
       hearsay statements was not tainted by a conflict of 
       interest. Rather, it was a sound decision, based on an 
       experienced trial lawyer's strategic considerations. 
 
United States v. Morelli, Opinion & Order, Crim. No. 93- 
210, at 7-8 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 1997). As the District Court 
also noted, this strategy was quite successful: "Of the 
eighteen counts in the indictment against Mr. Roizman, he 
was acquitted of 13, including the global conspiracy 
charge." Id. at 7 n.5. 
 
Roizman alleges that Porotsky's hearsay statements 
incriminated him in several ways. The District Court 
rejected this argument, finding that impeaching Porotsky 
would have made Roizman's "wallflower defense" less 
successful. See id. at 7. It also concluded that Porotsky's 
statements were "so cumulative and peripheral" that 
impeaching them would have at best made no difference. 
Based on our review of the record, we find that the District 
Court's conclusions were probably correct, and certainly 
not clearly erroneous. Based on these facts, we agree with 
the District Court's conclusion that cross-examination of 
Porotsky was not an alternative strategy with "sufficient 
substance to be a viable alternative." Gambino, 864 F.2d at 
1070. 
 
Even if we were to conclude that the District Court did 
clearly err in its conclusions on the previous point, we 
would still affirm its rejection of Roizman's claim. We do not 
believe that the alleged alternative strategy of impeaching 
Porotsky created a conflict between Silverman's duties to 
Roizman and Porotsky. The key point, and one only 
recognized in Gambino as far as we can tell, is that we 
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must look at the attorney's duties to both clients. An actual 
conflict exists only if the proposed alternative strategy (a) 
could benefit the instant defendant and (b) would violate 
the attorney's duties to the other client. See Gambino, 864 
F.2d at 1070. 
 
In Gambino, the court rejected the defendant's actual 
conflict claim because it found that the proposed strategy 
would not have hurt the attorney's other client. Gambino 
involved a drug distribution charge. The defendant 
(Gambino) claimed that his attorney could have argued that 
another of the attorney's clients, Mazzarra, might have 
committed the crime with which Gambino was charged. But 
Mazzarra was not a codefendant, and the proposed 
argument would not have rendered Mazzarra directly liable 
to punishment. Furthermore, the information Gambino 
contended would have supported the strategy came from 
the government's files. Exposing this evidence at trial would 
not have given the government any new information that 
would have made it more likely to charge Mazzarra. The 
court concluded that no actual conflict existed because 
"Mazzara would not have been prejudiced if Evseroff [the 
attorney] had [tried to show he was the source of the 
heroin] and thus it follows that appellant and Mazzara did 
not have conflicting interests in Evseroff's performance at 
trial." Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1071. 
 
We think that this case is analogous to Gambino. 
Porotsky was not a defendant in Roizman's case. While 
Porotsky probably would not have wanted to be impeached 
as a criminal, he had been convicted of various crimes, and 
numerous other witnesses at trial had discussed his 
criminal activities. (In fact, the impeachment would have 
involved almost exclusively the evidence of these 
convictions.) Furthermore, the evidence Silverman would 
have used to impeach Porotsky's statements -- including 
Porotsky's prior convictions and present indictments-- 
would most likely have come from the government. We do 
not see how exposing such information, already in the 
possession of the government, could have harmed 
Porotsky's interests.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Roizman also suggests that Silverman should have used information 
he acquired from Porotsky during his representation of him to impeach 
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B. Potential Conflict of Interest 
 
Roizman also claims that his conviction should be 
reversed under a potential conflict theory. We reject this 
claim as well. 
 
When a district court is aware, or should be aware, of a 
potential conflict of interest on the part of the defendant's 
attorney, the court must inquire as to whether the 
defendant is aware of and waives this conflict. See Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Wood v. Georgia, 450 
U.S. 261, 272 (1981); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 
1084, 1143 (3d Cir. 1990). Roizman argues that reversal is 
required not only when the trial court is aware of such a 
conflict and fails to act but also when the prosecutor and 
defense attorney are aware of one. Although Roizman cites 
several cases from courts within the Second Circuit in 
support of this claim, see, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 
861 F. Supp. 266, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the court of appeals 
in that circuit has at most only exhorted prosecutors to 
advise the trial courts when they are aware of conflicts, see 
United States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1996). See 
also Cerro v. United States 872 F.2d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 
1989) ("We do not disagree with the propriety of such a 
recommendation under like circumstances, but we 
conclude that it is not a constitutional requirement. In the 
present case, the prosecutor was under no constitutional 
duty to advise the trial court of a potential conflict based on 
the information available to him."). They have not held, and 
we do not hold, that a prosecutor's -- or a defense 
attorney's -- failure in this respect is grounds for reversal. 
Since Roizman makes no claim that the District Court was 
or should have been aware of Silverman's potential conflict, 
he is not entitled to a reversal on these grounds. 17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Porotsky. We reject this contention. If Silverman had not represented 
Porotsky and thus created the alleged conflict of interest in this case, 
he 
would not have had access to this information. Roizman cannot prevail 
on the argument that his interests were harmed by Silverman's failure to 
use information he acquired in confidence from Porotsky to impeach 
Porotsky. Accordingly, we conclude that no actual conflict with 
Silverman's duties to Porotsky affected his representation of Roizman. 
 
17. Finally, Roizman argues that we should reverse the District Court's 
decision because it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his 
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For all these reasons, the judgments of the District Court 
with respect to both Morelli and Roizman will be affirmed. 
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claims. Because we conclude that the District Court did not err in 
rejecting Roizman's claims based on the documentary evidence before it, 
we see no need for the court to have conducted further evidentiary 
proceedings. 
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